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This draft report has been prepared under contract to the 
CSIRO Urban Water Program that is ably led by Andrew 
Speers.  During its preparation, we have had the opportunity 
to work closely with the Program’s Project Managers.  The 
innovative work they are leading suggests that it is technically 
feasible to significantly improve urban water use.  The 
technical opportunities are many and a significant number 
appear to be affordable.  The focus of this report is on 
valuation of externalities. 
Many people who supplied documents and background 
information have assisted preparation of this report.  Their 
contribution is acknowledged with gratitude.  In particular, 
we would like to thank Doug Young and Stefan Hajkowicz for 
their perceptive comments on the proposed method and 
Sharon Rochow for assistance with the preparation of this 
report. 
The next step is to test the methodology in one or more 
locations.  One obvious place to do this is the Ellenbrook case 
study.  We caution, however, that many of the externalities in 
this area arise from agriculture.   
John Bowers 
Mike Young  
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VALUING EXTERNALITIES:  A METHODOLOGY FOR URBAN WATER 
Introduction 
The objectives of this report are to define and describe 
`externalities including resource management costs’ for the 
urban water sector and to provide a method of valuing.  From 
an urban water perspective, externalities are the sub-set of 
non-market effects on the welfare of third parties and the 
environment, that arise from water use.   A more precise 
definition is provided later in the report. 
The report is prepared against the backdrop of the Council of 
Australian Government’s (COAG) Water Reform Framework.  
This framework proposes a transition to a situation where 
there is full cost recovery for water use.  Full costs are defined 
to include externalities.1  For the purposes of this report, we 
assume that full costs means full long-run marginal cost.  In 
parallel with this process, the CSIRO Urban Water Program 
and others are seeking to find ways to improve urban water 
use.  Two uses can be identified for the methodology and 
recommendations presented in this report: 
•  price determination; and 
•  assessment of the costs and benefits of alternative ways of 
managing the urban water system. 
A parallel report (Young, 1999) identifies opportunities to use 
the proposed method and the information it provides to 
improve the nature of externalities associated with urban 
water use.  This parallel report is practical in its orientation 
and written to reveal the nature of global experience in 
managing externalities. 
                                                 
1   Section 3 (a) (i) of the Strategic Water Reform Framework requires 
the adoption of pricing regimes based on full-cost recovery.  The Expert 
Group established under section 3 (b) (i) defined full economic costs as the 
sum of operating and maintenance expenses, administrative costs, 
replacement cost depreciation, the opportunity cost of capital and 
externalities (COAG, 1995).  The Guidelines for Water Pricing, endorsed by 
all jurisdictions, broadly accepts this definition, but in Principle 5, clarifies 
the notion of the opportunity cost of capital and specifies the treatment of 
taxation in the calculation of full costs.  Principle 7 requires transparency 
in price determination in the treatment of various items of full cost 
including `externalities’.  Externalities are further defined to include 
resource management costs.    
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The urban water system 
In most parts of Australia, the supply system draws its water 
from surface water but in a few systems use is made of 
groundwater (Figure 1).  The water supply system and the 
storm water system are largely independent but interaction 
between them is common.  An overview of the place of the 










Figure 1  An overview of the urban water system 
The complete urban water system consists of: 
•  water supply;  
•  a wastewater return; 
•  a stormwater (Box 2). 
A description of each of these components is provided in Box 
2. 
The urban water supply system 
The typical Australian situation has a single body, normally a 
public monopoly utility, responsible for both supply of clean 
water and treatment/disposal of dirty water to a set of 
customers.  The customers demand clean water, some of 
which they convert to dirty water, that is returned to the 
utility for disposal.  Thus, the flow of dirty water in the system  
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is less than the supply of clean, the difference comprising 
system losses.  System losses have two components: 
transmission losses and water consumption. 
Box 1  An overview of the place of the urban water system in 
the Australian economy 
Australia demands about 20,000 Gigalitres (GL) of water per annum.  
Most, 72%  is for irrigation of agricultural and horticultural crops and 
pasture.  Urban demand, including industries and services located in 
urban areas, is about 3,500 GL per annum.  Urban domestic households 
demand 12% of the remaining 28%.   
Urban water use has been growing at a little over 2% per annum over the 
last 15 years.  But this growth in use is more than explained by the growth 
of the urban population.  Per capita water consumption is declining in the 
urban sector and expected to continue.  AATSE (1999) forecast growth in 
domestic demand at 1.8% per annum to reach about 4,000 GL by 2020 as a 
result of urban population growth.  The forecast growth rate of urban 
water demand is lower than that of the rural sector. 
Urban areas are responsible for almost all the flows of wastewater into 
both inland and coastal waters.  Although they may contain contaminants 
such as nutrients and pesticide residues, return flows from irrigation 
systems are not classified as wastewater.   
In aggregate, urban wastewater flows in Australia are currently slightly 
less than 2,000 GL per annum and are forecast to rise to 2,500 GL by 2020.  
Because most urban development is on the coast, the overwhelming 
majority of wastewater flows (about two thirds) are discharged to coastal 
waters.   
Source: AATSE, 1999. 
The destination of the wastewater determines the nature of the 
system.  In a sequential system, wastewater is available for 
reprocessing as clean water.  In the extreme case, abstraction 
and discharges are to the same water body so that dirty water 
discharges automatically contaminate the clean water supply.  
In less extreme cases, the sources are partially or wholly 
separable.  The alternative nodal system is one where the 
discharges are wholly outside the supply system and cannot 
contaminate it.  A coastal community with discharges to the 
ocean might be a pure nodal system.  Because the majority of 
the population lives close to the coast, Australian systems are 
mostly nodal.  This is not the case in other countries.  In many 
parts of the world water is reused many times.  The Murray  
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Darling River system is probably Australia’s best known 
example of a sequential system. 
Stormwater 
In Australia, stormwater collection and disposal is typically 
separated from the wastewater flow.  There is thus no need for 
the responsibility for stormwater to be vested in a single 
wastewater authority.  Typically, stormwater drainage is 
managed by local government.  In larger population centres 
often sewage and water supply is managed by an independent 
authority or company.  This is not always the case elsewhere.  
In the UK, for instance, stormwater is normally channelled 
into the sewage system.  The economic case for separation 
hinges on the variability of rainfall.  In a dry country, such as 
Australia, integration would require an expensive increase in 
the capacity of the sewerage infrastructure to cope with 
irregular large flows.  In practice, the choice is not 
dichotomous, and the optimal division of stormwater flows, 
between the sewers and dedicated infrastructure, is likely to 
vary across and between urban areas.  Recent thinking sees a 
case for more integration than was thought desirable in the 
past (Thomas et al., 1997). 
Regardless of whether economic and engineering factors 
favour integration or separation of wastewater and 
stormwater flows, stormwater management and disposal is an 
activity outside of the water supply system.  Stormwater, in 
fact, imparts externalities to the water supply system, causing 
sewers and sewage treatment facilities to overflow and 
contaminating sources of water supply system.  We return to 
this issue below. 
Box 2 
System supply modifies the flow of water through the environment to 
enable delivery to users.  Modifications can be both temporal and spatial: 
- Spatial - Impoundment (reservoirs etc); 
- Temporal - In general water demand patterns and, hence, abstraction will 
differ from the pattern of system flows.   
Normally, system supply will tend to reduce seasonal variations. 
Use reduces the volume of water in the system and available for the 
environment, recreation, etc.  
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Wastewater return chemically modifies the water system.  Some of the 
water supplied is converted to dirty water by the recipients.  When 
returned, dirty water alters the composition of the system downstream of 
the point of discharge. Stormwater management has the potential to decrease 
or increase recreational and amenity values through sensitive design.   
Local wetlands, for example, can improve landscape amenity areas.  
Recreation fields can be built within floodways. 
Stormwater can be used to recharge aquifers.  Stormwater disposal erratically 
amplifies flows through the system and introduces pollutants into it from 
both external and internal sources. 
Pricing water services 
A producer of a good or service would be expected to set a 
price to cover the full costs of its supply and to earn a profit.  
Because of the essential nature of water services to human 
welfare and environmental health, other factors also feature in 
the pricing decision.  These include issues of wealth and 
income distribution and the costs of resource management.  
But, in addition to cost recovery and distributional questions, 
water pricing may be used for a variety of purposes and it is 
important to clarify them.  The principal ones are: 
i.  To internalise the externalities of specific uses of water; 
ii.  To manage or reduce overall demand by targeting 
specific uses; and 
iii.  To encourage water use practices that reduce the costs of 
water supply. 
Failure to understand the multiple purposes for which water 
prices are used can lead to confusion.  One reason is that the 
perception of externalities is situational or context dependant.  
Thus, in a context of excess demand for water (e.g.  a drought), 
non-essential water use such as watering lawns or garden 
flower beds may be viewed as anti-social and there may be a 
temptation to present non-essential uses as imparting negative 
externalities on the system.  In fact, in such a context, targeting 
non-essential uses is a perfectly legitimate and possibly 
effective means of demand management.  It is a standard 
instrument for drought management in, for instance, the UK. 
As another example, the separation of black and grey water 
flows in discharges from households, permits substantial 
reductions in the costs of dirty water treatment.  Utilities could 
legitimately use the water pricing system to encourage 
consumers to invest in separation capacities and to adopt  
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practices that lead to separation.  There is then, a temptation to 
present the household that does not separate black from grey 
flows as conveying a negative externality on the system, 
raising the cost of dirty water treatment and thereby imposing 
costs on other householders and possibly on the environment.  
This is the case in purpose (iii) above. 
Water use practices that raise costs of supply are only an 
externality if catchment management plans, or some other 
form of regulation that defines the structure of property 
rights, make them so.  Thus, if a statute were adopted which 
required households to separate grey and black water, then 
the household that failed to do so would be conveying an 
externality on others. 
If the COAG principles of full cost pricing are to be 
implemented it is necessary to clarify what is meant by an 
externality. 
What is an externality? 
In a market economy, individuals and households satisfy 
many, probably most, of their needs by buying goods and 
services ‘in the market place’.  The household’s ability to buy 
goods and services, and, hence, to satisfy its requirements, is 
determined by its income, and in official statistics we use the 
income of the household as a measure of its level of welfare or 
standard of living. 
Economists see the household’s welfare as achieved by buying 
and selling in the market place.  As such, the welfare levels of 
households are interdependent, since the prices of goods and 
services are determined by the forces of supply and demand.  
But trading in the market place and altering prices is not the 
only way in which economic units such as households and 
firms affect each other’s welfare.  They also do so directly 
without the intercession of markets.  Where that happens we 
have a potential externality. 
Definitions of externalities vary (Baumol and Oates, 1975).  
Most define them, as we do, as a legitimate action by one 
economic unit that impacts on the welfare of another 
economic unit that does not take place through markets 
(Bowers,1997).  McTaggart et al.  (1999) define an externality as 
a cost or benefit that arises from an economic transaction that 
falls on people who don’t participate in the transaction.   Not 
all non-market transactions are externalities.  As Baumol and 
Oates observe, “If I purposely  manoeuvre my car to splatter  
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mud on a pedestrian I dislike, he is given no choice in the 
amount of mud he ‘consumes,’ but one would not normally 
define this as an externality.”  Anti-social forms of behaviour, 
crime, etc.  are usually excluded. 
One of the characteristics of an externality - lack of deliberate 
intent to harm - is important (Mishan, 1969).  If I decide to 
burn down my neighbour’s house there is no externality, but 
if sparks from my barbecue set it alight then there is.  It does 
not matter for this definition whether, when I lit the barbecue, 
I was aware of the fire risk, nor whether my action was 
negligent.  As long as the intention was not to cause a fire and 
no laws were broken, we have an externality.  Similarly, when 
a factory or sewage treatment plant legally disposes effluent 
into a stream, it probably does not take into account the costs 
that this action imposes on members of a fishing club who like 
to fish lower down in the stream (McTaggart et al., 1999). 
Internalisation of externalities: making those who cause the 
externalities aware of what they are doing and providing them 
with incentives to change their behaviour; is an important 
objective of environmental policy.  This is, of course, one of 
the reasons for valuing and pricing for externalities.  There 
are, however, many ways of internalise externalities.  Grants, 
regulations, information, tradeable emission permits and 
Pigouvian2 taxes are all options (Young, 1999).   
Externalities can be either positive - one economic unit’s action 
raises the welfare of another – or negative - one unit’s action 
reduces the welfare of another.  The increase or decrease in the 
welfare is called the social benefit or social cost.  This 
terminology is summarised in Table 1. 
It is consistent with the definition of an externality to 
consciously design systems so as to maximise positive and 
minimise negative impacts.  Recent developments in the 
design of stormwater collection and treatment systems have 
created a whole new range of positive externalities in the form 
of improvements to the urban environment.  These include 
created wetlands and the return of flow channels to natural 
states.  Since they require capital investment, the costs of these 
welcome improvements will be incorporated into the price of 
                                                 
2   In a classic text, Pigou (1920) formulated the idea that by taxing 
decision makers, the party with the property right, externalities could be 
internalised.  
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stormwater services.  These improvements are part of the duty 
of care that we discuss below.   
Table 1.  Terminology of Externalities 
 
Description of process  Welfare change  
classified as 
Positive externality  Economic Unit A’s action 
improves unit B’s welfare  
Social benefit 
Negative externality  Economic unit A’s action worsens 
unit B’s welfare 
Social cost 
 
There are two approaches to the definition of what is a social 
cost and what is a benefit.  The conventional approach is to 
define costs in terms of the current practice and current albeit 
incomplete, specification of property rights.  The alternative 
approach is to measure benefits against an agreed benchmark. 
Indeed, public perceptions as to what is a positive externality 
and what is a negative externality often differ to that defined 
by economists.  The common lay interpretation of a ‘negative 
externality’ is anything that a person causing the externality 
should be charged for.  That is, the polluter should pay. 
In economics, typically, the frame of reference used is the 
status quo.  Measured against the status quo, pollution 
reduction is defined as a ‘positive’ not a ‘negative’ externality 
because the action increases the welfare of those affected by it.  
The way out of this communication impasse is to develop new 
language which sends clear transparent signals. 
Generally, use rights and obligations are defined in legislation, 
regulations and catchment management plans.   Real property 
arrangements and license conditions also affect such 
definitions, as does common law.   Collectively, all these 
mechanisms define each person’s duty to care for the 
environment.   Duty of care for the environment is a term 
gaining gradual acceptance in rural areas.  Duty of care is a 
new concept for urban water users.3  Often the implied 
definition of duty of care suggests some degree of social 
acceptance and tolerance of practices that degrade the 
                                                 
3   The idea of duty of care for the environment was developed by 
Binning and Young (1998) and has since been given wider currency by the 
Industry Commission (1998).    
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environment.  Water users are allowed to create some 
‘negative’ externalities but not too many! 
Acceptance of a duty of care benchmark means that any 
activity that produces an outcome above this standard is a 
positive externality.  Duty of care, however, is not a static 
concept.  In particular, management plans often propose to 
change the way duty of care is defined.  Most catchment 
management plans suggest an expectation that standards will 
be raised through time and raised without payment of 
compensation.  For example, the discharge of secondary 
treated sewage to many river systems was considered 
acceptable until algal blooms became common.  Now tertiary 
treatment is required.  Duty of care is an evolving 
concept (Figure 2). Catchment Management plans can define 
duty of care as a set of minimum water quality objectives 
(WQO) that all users must pursue.  This means that positive 
externalities may initially be most appropriately dealt with 
through the use of positive price signals but, at some stage 
in the future, be more appropriately managed via the use of 
negative price signals.  Further explanation is necessary to 
clarify this point.  To speed adjustment, initially, people 
causing the externality might be paid an incentive to 
encourage them to change practice.  After an appropriate 
period, however, all might be expected to adopt the preferred 
practice.  When compliance becomes a duty, those who do not 










Figure 2   Dynamic nature of the distinction between positive 
and negative externalities.  Actions defined as 
positive today may be defined as negative 
tomorrow  
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Tangible and intangible externalities 
From a valuation perspective, there are two types of 
externalities; 
•  tangible externalities; and 
•  intangible externalities. 
After the occurrence of a flood, society counts the cost.  For 
many of the impacts it is possible to impute money values to 
the damage.  These include such things as the costs of 
repairing buildings, redecorating and replacing furnishings 
and vehicles that have been destroyed or damaged beyond 
economic repair.  Equally, the cost of clean up of pollution can 
be calculated – so many workers with the equipment for so 
many days.  These impacts are known as tangibles; the assets 
effected, whether items of furniture or workers, are traded in 
markets and have market values. 
With thought, the area of tangibility can be made quite wide.  
Thus, with people who have been injured or have died in the 
flood, we can calculate the hospital and funeral costs that have 
been incurred.  If the casualties are children or adults of 
working age we can also impute their lost earning potential 
using market information about wages.  This can either be 
seen as a loss of income to the affected households or lost 
productive potential to employers or society.  But however 
inventive we may be, the tangible area has limits.  There is no 
market that allows us to put a value on human life nor on the 
pain and suffering experienced by the victims or the grief of 
their loved ones.  Pain, grief and suffering are intangibles.  An 
intangible externality is one where there is no market to which 
reference can be made to achieve a valuation.  Damage to 
wildlife and losses of biodiversity are intangibles; some 
amenity effects are intangibles also.  
The key to distinguishing tangible from intangible 
externalities is that intangibles possess the characteristics of 
public goods (or public bads).  (see appendix 3) 
Classification of Intangibles 
Valuation of externalities is simpler if a classification system 
can be found that is discrete.  That is, that there is no overlap 
between any two categories and, hence, minimal risk of 
double counting.  One way of doing this is to focus on the 
receptors where each externality expresses itself.  
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The externalities should be identified and classified into the 
following categories:4 
•  Production externalities; 
•  Property damage externalities; 
•  Fisheries externalities; 
•  Recreation externalities; 
•  Amenity externalities; 
•  Health externalities; 
•  Wildlife and bio-diversity externalities. 
In Table 2, externalities are classified spatially and by 
economic service.  This classification should be applied 
separately to each water service then quantified and valued 
using the approaches set out below and in Appendices  One 
and Two.  In many cases, it will be more efficient to value all 
the externalities in one area and then partition them according 
to their source. 
                                                 
4   COAG Water Reform documents define externalities to include 
resource management costs.  By this they mean the costs faced by 
governments as they monitor externalities and manage them to minimise 
negative impacts.  Strictly, these are not externalities but rather direct costs 
of water management.    
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Table 2 Mapping of conceptual to spatial analysis of externalities 
 
Spatial location  Type of externality 
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As explained in detail in Appendix Two, different valuation 
techniques are appropriate for tangible and intangible 
externalities.  Thus, it is necessary to classify the identified 
externalities of the water supply and the stormwater system 
by their tangibility.   
 
Table 3 Classification of tangible and intangible externalities 
 
Economic Service  Type of Externality 
 Tangible  Intangible 
System Supply  Recreation; property    Wildlife 




Wastewater Return  Production; health (part); 
amenity (part); recreation 
(part)  
Wildlife; health (part); 
amenity (part); 
recreation (part) 
Stormwater management  Production; health (part); 
property; amenity (part); 
recreation (part) 
Wildlife; health (part); 
amenity (part); 
recreation (part) 
Stormwater disposal  Production; property; amenity 
(part) 
Wildlife; health (part); 
amenity (part) 
A framework for valuation 
The steps in the valuation process are as follows: 
1.  Identify the externalities separately for each water service 
(water supply, sewage treatment, and stormwater 
disposal) and classify them according to the above 
categories.  Efficiency requires that the externalities 
attributable to each service should incorporated into the 
prices of each service (Box 3). 
2.  Determine the physical magnitude of each externality 
through the application of a dose response model.  
(Appendix One) 
3.  Value the physical magnitudes in the ways discussed 
below and summarised in Table 4.  The valuation 
methodologies are discussed in Appendix 2.    
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Principles of water service pricing 
1.Separation of services 
Economic efficiency requires that consumers should be faced with a set of prices for 
services that reflect the relative costs of their provision.  In the current context this means 
that the full costs of each water service, including externalities, as defined by COAG 
should be incorporated into the price of that service.  This means:    
Water supply should be metered and charged the full long-run marginal cost per 
litre.5 
Sewage discharges, ideally, should be metered and separately priced.  Realistically 
metering is not possible at present, so that sewage charges will be on a per 
property basis.  None-the–less, the sewage charge should be clearly 
distinguished from charges for water supply and, where appropriate, storm 
water charge and should be based on the full long-run marginal cost of the 
service.  Account should be taken of the possibility of system failure and impacts 
such failures may impose on tangible and intangible values of concern to people. 
Storm water charges should be property based, in proportion to anticipated load 
and calculated on the long-run marginal cost of disposal.  Where sewage and 
storm water disposal are provided by a single utility, the two charges should be 
clearly separated.  It is desirable that indicators of contribution to the problem 
should differentiate stormwater charges.  Indicators should be simple.  Ideally 
charges should increase with roof area of property or, preferably, total 
impervious area.  Deductions for installation of a storage tank and a functioning 
pervious soakaway system and a surcharge for a metal roof are options to be 
considered.  The scaling factors should be based on estimates of how total storm 
water volume entering the disposal system varies with the area of 
impermeability multiplied by long-run marginal cost per unit volume of storm 
water.  The deductions similarly should be based on estimates of the contribution 
that these factors make to the reduction in storm water load multiplied by unit 
volume full cost as before.  Metal roofs add to the heavy metal content of 
stormwater that pollutes the receiving water and has adverse impacts on wildlife 
and fisheries and, if the receiving water is used for water supply, imposes 
treatment costs.  The surcharge should be based on the cost of treatment 
necessary to keep the heavy metals out of the receiving water.  Alternatively, and 
as a second best, the cost of meeting water quality objectives plus any identified 
costs of treating water for use should be used.  The problem of stormwater 
pollution may additionally require policies directed at other targets, e.g. on the 
behaviour of car and pet owners.   
 
Production, property damage and fisheries are tangible 
externalities.  Recreation and amenity are partial intangibles.  
Health externalities are part tangibles and part intangibles.  
                                                 
5   It is not clear from current statements by COAG whether or not 
full cost means full average cost or full marginal cost.  We assume that 
they mean full long-run marginal cost as this is what is required for 
economic efficiency.  
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For this exercise, however, we recommend that they be treated 
as intangibles.  This is for several reasons: 
1.  The imputation of tangible health effects (sickness and 
resulting loss of working time and death) to environmental 
pollution has proved extremely difficult even in relatively 
straightforward cases of air pollution. 
2.  In the water environment, public health restrictions on the 
composition and location of discharges already serve to 
minimise those impacts.  The one possible exception is 
discharges to coastal waters but even here proven health 
effects are difficult to establish. 
3.  Water quality objectives are designed with an eye to 
human health as well as wildlife considerations so that 
pricing for water quality improvements benefits both. 
The only exception to this practice should be stormwater 
impacts where injury and death from flooding are 
possibilities. 
Wildlife and bio-diversity effects are pure intangibles. 
Once the physical magnitude of the externalities has been 
determined via dose response modelling the valuation of 
externalities is as follows.   
For simplicity of presentation, the following discussion assumes that 
the effect of the externality is continuous.  Where effects are periodic, 
as with stormwater, events and system failure, and also with 
externalities of low water flows and system failures, the valuation 
should be multiplied by the estimated annual probability of the effect 
occurring.  The calculation of return periods and adjustment of costs 
and benefits for them is standard practice in engineering manuals on 
flood prevention, and these should be consulted where necessary.  
Our proposals for the valuation of intangibles rely on WQO as 
expressed in catchment management plans, etc, which are discussed 
later in the report.  In addition, and as stated earlier in the 
discussion about the role of catchment management plans and the 
importance of understanding duty of care, a person experiencing an 
externality may not have to pay to change it. The question of the 
appropriate instrument or instruments to use depends, among other 
things, on what rights they have and what duties have been imposed 
on the person causing the externality. 
Valuing the tangibles 
Production externalities for manufacturing and extractive 
industry, should be based on an estimate of lost output  
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volume multiplied by the ratio of value added to output for 
the industry concerned.  Data should be derived from ABS 
production data at the highest available dis-aggregation.  
Where the externality results in additional costs rather than 
lost production, it will be necessary to collect cost data from 
the affected establishments.  For water-based commercial 
tourism (e.g. scenic boat trips), the valuation should be the 
number of days for which water quality conditions prevent 
operation multiplied by some percentage of the gross daily net 
revenue (our provisional best guess would be to make the 
fraction 50%, but this can vary with the enterprise and may 
require further investigation).  A potential problem here 
concerns the diversion of tourist traffic to other operators or 
other days and times.  Our advice assumes that the value is 
lost and not simply re-distributed.  For delays to road traffic 
(probably mainly a consequence of stormwater flooding), the 
standard practice for transport improvement appraisal should 
be used.  Estimated time delays x average wage rate for 
commercial traffic; estimated time delays x 30% of average 
wage rate for all other traffic including commuting. 
Property damage should be based on local land values where 
land is lost to erosion, or local property values where built 
structures are affected.  This is likely to be a factor mainly for 
stormwater.  Damage to infrastructure such as roads and 
railways should be valued at the costs of repair.  Other 
property suffering stormwater damage, such as fittings and 
furnishing of houses, vehicles etc.  should be valued at 
replacement cost.  In valuing property damage particularly 
from sources other than stormwater, care should be taken to 
avoid double counting with production externalities.  Any 
externality should only be valued once. 
Fishery externalities.  Should be valued at the difference 
between the carrying capacity of the receiving water at the 
current and target WQO (see below) multiplied by an 
assumed sustainable off-take percentage.  For recreational 
fisheries, this should be multiplied by the unit market value of 
the species concerned.  Species that are not marketed should 
be treated as wildlife.  For commercial fisheries, the price 
weight should be 50% of unit landed value to allow for the 
costs of the fishery.  This is a tentative judgement.  Some 
studies suggest much higher costs (e.g. in some ocean 
fisheries).  If the issue is important for water pricing, further 
investigation should be undertaken.  Where impoundment 
has created a fishery that would otherwise not be there, it  
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becomes a positive externality that should be a deduction 
from the price of the water service.  Valuation should be on 
the basis of off-take with the other valuation rules as above. 
Valuing partial intangibles 
Recreation and amenity effects should only be considered where 
they are of major significance.  Minor ones are incorporated in 
the treatment of wildlife and bio-diversity.  Major effects 
might be the recreational benefits of impoundments  (a 
deduction from the water service price) or the loss of 
opportunities from rivers and coastal waters polluted by 
sewage (an addition).  For these cases, what is needed is an 
estimate of visitor days (number of visitors x average duration 
of visit) created or lost.  This estimate might be weighted by 
the results of a contingent valuation or travel cost exercise 
designed to determine consumer valuation.  In the absence of 
that, the conventional approach is to value at a fraction of the 
average wage rate.  30% is the standard valuation of leisure 
time in transport studies.  A note of caution must be sounded 
here.  There are alternatives to many such facilities so that the 
non-availability of one site might simply result in the use of 
another.  In that case, the value of even major recreational and 
amenity losses and gains may be very low, amounting to no 
more than some additional time spent in travel, and arguably 
some reduced utility deriving from a less suitable substitute.  
For international tourists who, once in Australia, are a captive 
population for the duration of the stay, and whose destination 
decision is unlikely to be influenced significantly by 
conditions at a specific site, our view is that the externality 
should have zero valuation.  A judgement is required as to the 
availability of recreational sites in the catchment, relative to 
demand.  Only when there is perceived to be a supply deficit 
should any valuation of the externality be made. 
Health effects.  From what has been said above, the only issue 
to be considered briefly here is the valuation of injury and 
death from stormwater effects.  Injury is typically valued at 
working days lost x mean wage rate plus medical costs.  
Deaths are valued similarly at working days lost through 
premature termination of life.  This requires an estimate of the 
mean age of death through flood events.  To this is added 
medical costs.  Burial expenses are conventionally ignored 
although, in strict logic, some allowance could be made for the 
fact that these are incurred earlier than would otherwise have 
been the case.  Finally, there is the element of pure 
intangibility.  It is conventional to add (e.g. in the valuation of  
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deaths through traffic accidents in road schemes) an arbitrary 
sum for ‘grief, pain and suffering.’ We make no 
recommendation on what this sum should be or whether it 
should be used.  One possible means of estimation, used in the 
USA, is to look at the sums awarded by courts as 
compensation to the relatives in industrial accidents where 
liability is established.  In UK road appraisal, the Ministry 
specifies a sum for use in cost benefit appraisal without 
explaining how this is derived. 
Valuing Pure Intangibles 
Wildlife and bio-diversity externalities should be calculated as 
the additional costs of achieving minimum target river water 
quality and flow level objectives which are derived from a 
duty of care.  These costs will include the costs of upgrading 
sewage treatment works, improving stormwater control and 
treatment, and allocating or importing environmental water to 
the catchment, as is proposed for the Murray assuming that 
water is traded fairly.  Imported water does not need to be 
valued at its opportunity cost, since this would involve double 
counting (the opportunity costs will already have been borne 
by those losing water rights).  The charging base is the 
additional system costs for meeting water quality objectives.  
These costs are dependent on the COAG full cost rules.  They 
should be calculated according to COAG rules for new 
investment, and include annual running costs, depreciation 
and required rate of return on the assets.  When those costs are 
actually incurred and the environmental improvements are 
presumed to have been made, there should be no change in 
the price of the water service (provided that they have been 
correctly calculated and upgraded each year to current prices).  
In an accounting sense, the composition of the charge will 
have shifted from the payment for an externality, to payment 
for investment incurred. 
It may be desired to bring about environmental improvements 
by changing behaviour, rather than making capital 
investments, and the tariff restructured to incorporate 
incentives to recycle grey water, separate grey from black 
water, etc.  Incentive payments should be based on the savings 
in expenditure on the river water quality improvement 
programme that these behavioural changes lead to.  The 
effects of more general incentives to save water (e.g. through 
multi part tariffs) are problematic because we lack knowledge 
about long-term price elasticities of demand.  
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Where wildlife and biodiversity objectives are poorly defined, 
the work may need to be underpinned by a series of studies to 
elucidate the nature of public preferences for wildlife and 
biodiversity conservation.  These studies should then be used 
to propose a set of objectives or outcomes against which costs 
can be measured.  
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Putting it all together 
Our proposals are summarised in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4 Summary of proposed methodology 
 
Externality type  Valuation method 
Production  Manufacturing and extraction: lost output x value added (ABS production 
data) 
Water based tourism: operating days lost x 50% of gross operating 
revenue (50% may be modified by investigation) 
Road traffic delays: time lost x average wage rate (commercial traffic) or 
30% of average wage rate (all other traffic).       
Property damage  Local land values where land is lost to erosion. 
Local property values or the cost of repair where built structures are 
affected. 
Costs of repair for roads and railways.   
Fisheries  Difference between carrying capacity at current and target WQO x 
sustainable off-take x Market price (edible species in recreational 
fisheries) or 50% of landed price (commercial fisheries).  Inedible species 
in recreational fisheries treated as wildlife.   
Recreation  Partially intangible.  Only major impacts valued, and then only if 
alternative facilities are in short supply.  Where a valuation is thought 
necessary, estimated visitor days affected x either 30% of average wage 
rate or willingness to pay derived from a CV or travel cost study.  Care 
should be taken to ensure that there is genuinely some lost value.  Minor 
impacts are treated as wildlife and bio-diversity. 
Pure intangible.  Full long-run marginal costs of upgrading from current to 
target water quality objectives.   
Amenity  As for recreation 
Health  Tangibles.  Full long-run marginal cost of damage to property 
associated/caused by floods.   
Partially intangible.  Injury and death (stormwater flooding) Estimated 
working days lost x average wage rate + medical costs.  We make no 
recommendation on whether or not a sum should be added for `grief, 
pain and suffering’.   
Pure intangible.  Full long-run marginal costs of upgrading from current to 
target water quality objectives. 
Wildlife and bio-diversity  Full long-run marginal costs of upgrading from current to target 
minimum water quality objectives.   
Resource management 
costs 
 Full long-run marginal cost to government of monitoring and managing 
externalities. 
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Water quality standards and objectives 
Throughout Australia, catchment management plans, water 
use licences and emission permits are used to define water 
quality objectives.  Essentially, these arrangements set out the 
duty of care provisions noted earlier.  To use the above 
valuation system for cost benefit analysis and/or to assess the 
appropriateness of water service prices, it is necessary for 
objectives to be presented as a set of indices.  It is also 
necessary for dose-response functions to be built so that 
assessment can be made about the likely change in WQO 
when loads to the system change.  We stress the importance of 
knowledge about dose response functions and the probability 
of their occurrence. 
Water quality objectives can be defined in a number of ways.  
Some of the main ones are: 
Classification by use.  Criteria here could include: 
•  Potability - suitable for drinking water supplies with only 
primary treatment, needs secondary treatment, is 
unsuitable) 
•  Recreation - safe for immersion sports, suitable for non-
immersion recreation, not suitable for recreation 
•  Fishing - well stocked with fish which are safe to eat, well 
stocked but unsafe to eat, poorly stocked, cannot support 
fish 
As with the other measures potability, and recreation 
indicators would need to be specified by the number of days 
for which the WQO was reached since temporary failures (e.g.  
bans on use of the Torrens because of blue algae and of 
Sydney beaches from exclusion). 
Biological status.  Waters can be classified by the density and 
number of species of biota that they will support.  This 
classification system utilises indicator species since total 
counts would be expensive to administer and subject to 
sampling hazard.  The indicator species have to be relatively 
abundant so that lower order biota are indicated (perhaps 
including aquatic insects but not birds or mammals) and 
would have to include species whose density is sensitive to 
variations in levels of the main pollutants.  One problem of 
this classificatory principle for a country as large and 
ecologically diverse as Australia, is that indicator species 
would have to vary .  This makes comparison among 
catchments difficult.  
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Biological oxygen demand (BOD) and suspended solids (SS).  These 
are the standard measures of sewage pollution.  The problem 
with them as an index of water quality, is that there are many 
other chemicals that affect the environmental health of a water 
source.  In Australia they would certainly need to be 
supplemented by salinity, although the sources of salinity are 
largely outside of the urban water system. 
Chemical and biochemical composition.  This classificatory system 
would extend the previous one to encompass other chemicals 
that are important to environmental health.  This is probably 
the most sophisticated form of index and can be mapped to 
the other partial indicators. 
WQO are commonly used for policy purposes in other 
countries.  The UK has used them for policy purposes since 
the 1980’s, and over time, the classificatory system has shifted 
from use measures through biological indicators to chemical 
indicators (Environment Agency, 1999). 
Monitoring WQO should be based on regular sampling of 
waters.  Standards would be based on the proportion of 
samples reaching the required standard (95% is the normal 
compliance criterion).  For use indicators, such as immersion 
sports, the number of days on which the water is suitable is an 
alternative basis for classification. 
With a set of WQO in place, intangibles are valued at the cost 
of meeting the WQO.  Costs will include additional treatment 
of dirty water and measures to maintain flow levels. 
Issues in the application of the framework 
 Multi-jurisdictional catchments  
Ideally, the pricing of water services and choice of the mix of 
instruments to convey appropriate signals, including the 
valuation of externalities, is best carried out at the level of the 
catchment.  This is particularly important in sequential 
systems, where the delivery of water services is divided 
between two or more water providers.  The impact of 
investment by any one of them on WQO, will be conditional 
on the actions of the others, posing problems for setting prices.  
In these circumstances, WQO can only be jointly delivered 
through co-operative planning and action.  One obvious and 
recommended strategy to achieve this, would be for all parties 
in the catchment to fund application of the methodology 
across the entire catchment.  By these means, co-ordination 
savings could be anticipated and WQO delivered at least cost.    
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Small and large towns 
The practical application of the pricing and valuation 
principles presented in this report requires the commitment of 
resources by the water industry.  The tasks include: 
•  modelling dose–response functions; 
•  developing indices for water quality; 
•  putting in place mechanisms for monitoring 
performance against WQO; and, 
•  ultimately, formulating and ultimately implementing 
the investment programs needed for WQO.   
These tasks may be beyond the resources of water service 
providers in small and even medium sized towns if acting 
alone.  Thus, if progress is to be made co-operation is clearly 
required.  If this does not happen, then the alternative scenario 
is one where the specification of WQO, and the programmes 
to upgrade, will be less comprehensive, and the pace of 
environmental improvement slower, in smaller communities.  
This may be unsustainable in the presence of 
interdependencies through sequentiality, as in the Murray-
Darling Basin.  Elsewhere, it is probably unacceptable on 
grounds of equity.   
The rural and the urban 
Over 70% of total water use in Australia is for agriculture.  A 
catchment will probably have interdependence between urban 
and rural water, use even if it is subject to none of the other 
problems discussed in this section.  If we are to make progress 
with environmental improvement, it is necessary that the 
principles of pricing are broadly comparable between urban 
and rural water users.  A methodology for valuing 
externalities associated with water use in agriculture is 
needed. 
Summary and conclusions   
This report is concerned with the methods by which 
externalities and resource management costs of urban water 
services should be valued, in order that they be incorporated 
into the full long-run cost pricing of water services and into 
benefit cost evaluations of managing the urban water system. 
Economic efficiency requires that the externalities attributable 
to each water service be identified and charged to that service.  
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Water pricing may also be used additionally to achieve 
broader objectives of the urban water cycle and to encourage 
changes in user behaviour  
Externalities produce social costs and benefits.  Perception of 
these social costs and benefits is mediated through the 
evolving concept of a duty of care for the environment.  While 
this notion is gaining acceptance among rural water users, it is 
new to urban water users. 
Externalities can be classified in a number of ways.  A critical 
distinction is between tangible externalities, where valuation 
can be derived directly or indirectly from prices prevailing in 
a market, and intangibles where no market exists. 
With intangible externalities, the basic requirements for the 
existence of a market do not exist.  Where these requirements 
are satisfied for either supply or demand, but not both, we 
have a partial intangible.  Where they are satisfied for neither 
we have a pure intangible.  The challenge of this report is to 
find means of valuing intangibles. 
The key to valuing these pure intangibles (and some partial 
intangibles) lies in definitions of duty of care and WQO.  The 
duty of care receives practical embodiment in WQO for each 
catchment.  The value of intangibles is correctly measured by 
the cost of meeting WQO provided that WQO are seen as a 
requirement of catchment management policy. 
After review, it is concluded that the techniques of contingent 
valuation, travel cost and surrogate markets, have a limited 
scope in providing money valuations for some partial 
intangibles, but are not practical and, arguably, not 
appropriate in principle, for pure intangibles.  These 
techniques, however, can have value in elucidating the nature 
of public preferences for the delivery of intangibles. 
The process of valuation has three stages: 
•  the identification and classification of externalities for 
each water service; 
•  determination of the physical scale of each externality 
through dose-response modelling; 
•  assessment of probabilities of occurrence; and the 
valuation of the physical quantities.   
The classification of externalities has to be designed to avoid 
overlap and double counting.  We suggest the use of a seven-
fold classification of externalities.  
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Where the data, or the understanding of the dynamics of the 
water system, are not sufficient for dose-response modelling, a 
relationship may need to be assumed.  Those interested in 
protecting the interests to the environment will argue that 
when making such assumptions, regard should be paid to the 
precautionary principle. 
We provide a detailed discussion of the valuation methods for 
each class of externalities.  The recommendations are 
summarised in Table 4. 
Central to the valuation exercise is the specification of 
catchment WQO and the costing of an investment and 
management programme to achieve them.  The costs of this 
programme should be in conformity with the COAG full-cost 
pricing principles.  We discuss how these principles should be 
applied to the exercise. 
WQO should be embodied in water quality indices.  There are 
a number of alternative bases for constructing such indices 
that we review.  It is important that performance under these 
indices be monitored at regular intervals and, for purposes of 
price setting, at least yearly.  In a separate report (Young 
1999), it is stressed the efficient externality management 
requires use of the full range of incentives instruments 
available.  Effective full-cost pricing requires use of a mix of 
instruments. 
Implementation of this framework will require co-operation 
and co-ordination in sequential catchments (where water is re-
used), with the pricing of rural water, and among authorities 
in small and medium sized towns, where otherwise resource 
constraints compromise the full-cost pricing programme. 
Recommendations for further work 
Methodology for the valuation of externalities is politically 
sensitive and controversial.  While basing our proposals on a 
firm grounding in the underlying economic principles, we 
have sought to be pragmatic and to push issues to the limit to 
achieve practical applicability.  The next steps as we see it are 
as follows: 
1.  Testing the framework for a range of conditions – for 
small, large and medium catchments, for nodal and 
sequential systems and for catchments with both urban 
and rural water use. 
2.  Development of a set of water quality indicators to be 
applied across catchments as a critical step forward.  
CSIRO  30  Policy and Economic 
Land and Water     Research Unit 
 
 
3.  We have been surprised by the lack of information of the 
relationship between discharge loadings and water quality 
outcomes.  We recommend that work on dose-response 
relationships be undertaken expeditiously.  
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APPENDIX ONE DOSE-RESPONSE MODELLING 
For an extensive summary of data available, readers are 
referred to the NSW EPA’s ENVALUE system.  This is 
available on the world wide web at 
http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/envalue/ 
The starting point for any valuation of an externality is some 
sort of dose-response model.  This models, in physical terms, the 
cause to the effect.  Thus, if the problem is the emission of 
dirty water resulting in eutrophication of the water system, 
the dose-response model will predict the degree of 
eutrophication from the volume of dirty water discharges and 
whatever other variables affect the outcome.  Dose-response 
modelling has to extend from the actions of the individual or 
body that is causing the externality, to the response of the 
individuals or bodies who perceive the external effect. 
 
 Initial cause ⇒ physical transmission ⇒ perception of effect 
 
Control cost ⇒ dose-response model ⇒ valuation of  
 externality 
Thus, our example above would be appropriate if people 
found the eutrophication of watercourses to be visually 
offensive, i.e. if eutrophication was the externality.  But it is 
more likely to be the effects of eutrophication that are of 
concern: e.g. the resultant modification of the ecosystem with 
changes in flora and fauna and hence in the degree of 
biodiversity.  In this case, the dose-response modelling has to 
extend to the prediction of changes in an index of biodiversity.  
This means that a dose-response model could be quite 
complex, involving several sub-systems, requiring the 
collection of complex data and the input of several scientific 
specialists.  Some observations are in order. 
The transmission mechanisms may not be sufficiently 
understood to permit prediction of response from dose.   
Alternatively, the system model may require information 
which is not available and which cannot be provided, except 
at prohibitive cost.  These problems frequently exist with 
impacts on wildlife and the natural environment.  Thus, one 
may know in general terms that eutrophication reduces 
ecosystem diversity but have insufficient understanding of the 
process to quantify the relationship.  Additionally, the  
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measurement of ecosystem diversity is itself far from 
straightforward. 
Where effects have persisted over long time periods, there is a 
problem of the initial point of reference.  It is widely agreed 
that impoundment and abstraction from the Murray River has 
had profound impacts on its estuarial ecosystems.  The first 
impoundment occurred last century and abstraction has 
increased with further impoundments from that date.  From 
which date (and hence from which flow rate) does one 
measure the externality? 
This problem is avoided in the cost-benefit analysis of 
alterations to the system (as might be proposed in a catchment 
management plan) since the status quo ante is then the point 
of departure.  Thus, the problem of assessing a new 
impoundment on the Murray may be tractable, although there 
is still a need for a dose-response model.  In the simple 
textbook notion of the optimum state of the environment, the 
problems of measuring total and incremental impacts are 
avoided by the assumption of a fully known (and probably 
linear) dose-response function.  In such a world, any pair of 
dose and response levels can be chosen by reference to control 
costs and valuations of the externality.  In practice, such 
functions often require considerable modification before they 
even begin to describe reality.  Unfortunately, such data is not 
always available. 
Where it is impossible to specify the precise dose-response 
relationship, but there is confidence that one exists (e.g. that 
reduced water flows reduce ecosystem diversity), there may 
be a case for assuming the function.  Where necessary, expert 
judgements can be used to guesstimate the most likely form 
and magnitude of the response associated with a “dose”.  The 
assumption will probably be of a linear mapping from cause 
to effect and derived through consultation with experts.  
Where the impacts on the water system are thought to be 
irreversible, as may be the case where endangered biota are 
found in the catchment, proceeding on an assumed dose 
response relationship may be justified by reference to the 
precautionary principle.  Of course, if the assumption is 
wrong, the outcome may not be what was intended.  
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APPENDIX TWO TECHNIQUES FOR THE MONETARY VALUATION OF 
EXTERNALITES 
Given predictions of responses from the dose-response model, 
there are broadly four main techniques for converting them 
into monetary values: 
•  Market valuation; 
•  Revealed preference techniques; 
•  Stated preference techniques; 
•  Neutralisation cost. 
We treat these in turn.  In each case, we state the principles 
before illustrating with examples. 
Market valuation 
Market valuation techniques are only possible where actual 
markets for the effects exist.  This can only be the case for 
tangible externalities.  Where a market valuation exists, it 
should always be used in preference to any of the other 
techniques discussed below.  Thus: 
   where possible, tangible externalities should always be 
given market valuations. 
In the presence of a tangible externality, there will, in 
principle, exist two market valuations: the recipient’s 
valuation and the provider’s valuation.  These will differ 
because the market has not ‘cleared’.  Choice should be based 
on the least cost way of resolving the problem.  This will 
depend among other things on the numbers of providers and 
recipients.  As an example, consider a situation where 
discharges from an urban sewage outfall reduce water quality 
for a manufacturing establishment located downstream, 
forcing it to treat its water or to purchase clean water from 
another catchment.  The two market valuations are: 
•  the factory’s valuation of clean water, measured by the 
delivered cost of water from the other catchment (unit 
price x volume purchased); and 
•  what it would cost to reduce the nutrient loading of the 
sewage discharges to a level where the factory could use 
the water (engineering estimates of the costs of the 
necessary treatment). 
Where alternative market valuations exist, choice between them 
should be made on the basis of the least cost method of eliminating 
the externality.  
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Revealed preference techniques 
While no direct market value exists for them, it is possible to 
make some inference about amenity and recreational values 
from observations of expenditure on other goods and services.  
There are two basic techniques available: 
Travel cost technique.  Some idea of consumer valuation of 
amenities and recreational resources such as national parks, 
viewpoints and beaches may be inferred from the money that 
they are prepared to spend in getting to and using them.  The 
notion here can be illustrated by a simple example.  If an 
individual or a family is prepared to spend, say, ten dollars in 
petrol and parking charges on visiting a national park we may 
infer that they place a value of at least ten dollars on the 
resulting recreational experience.  This simple idea can be 
elaborated to yield an estimate of the recreational and amenity 
value of the facility.  The methodology requires a sample 
survey of visitors to provide the information on travel 
expenditure (mode, time and distance) demographic 
characteristics (age, sex, family size) and purpose of visit. 
Surrogate market technique.  While people do not directly buy 
amenity as a separate good or service, they may buy it 
indirectly as a quality or characteristic of something else.  
Where this is so it is possible, in principle at least, to isolate the 
value of amenity.  Almost all the work under this technique 
relates to property prices.  It is observed that property prices 
are affected by visual amenity.  Properties with views of 
beaches, national parks etc.  command a premium.  Equally, 
proximity to facilities of this type can also raise prices.  The 
property price premium is viewed as the capitalised valuation 
of the amenity and studies seek to isolate the role of amenity 
from the multitude of other factors affecting the price of 
property. 
Recreation and amenity are partial intangibles.  Revealed 
preference techniques have been widely used for valuing 
them, particularly in the context of cost benefit studies.  There 
are many examples of applications to the water system 
including environmental enhancement.6  The techniques can 
be viewed as substitutes, with choice between them 
determined by the nature of the problem.  Even so both 
                                                 
6   Bicknell (1998) has recently used of house price analysis to 
measure the amenity benefits of planting native vegetation on urban 
watercourses in Wellington NZ.   
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techniques pose difficulties to the analyst.  The travel cost 
technique requires that site visits are the intended and sole 
purpose of visitor journeys.  This is often not the case.  
Isolating the amenity component of house prices requires 
statistical control for the other factors.  In practice, the set of 
price determinants cannot be fully specified, some 
components cannot be accurately measured, and collinearity 
between determinants is a problem.  In consequence, estimates 
of valuations for similar phenomena can vary widely between 
studies and between the two techniques.  It is not possible 
from the available literature, to derive anything like standard 
valuations, so any use would require a special study.  None-
the-less, the use of one or other should be considered where 
changes in the catchment water system, or major 
developments in stormwater management, are expected to 
have substantial recreational or amenity impacts.  In these 
circumstances contingent valuation (see below) is an 
alternative. 
Stated preference techniques 
Stated preference techniques rely on questionnaires 
administered, ideally in face to face interviews, to a statistical 
sample of those who are experiencing the externality.  The 
intention is to determine what respondents would be willing 
to pay in a hypothetical market for the externality.  Hence, 
these techniques are alternatively known as hypothetical 
market techniques.  The major hypothetical market technique 
is contingent valuation (CV).  CV might be described as the 
flavour of the decade in environmental economics.  It has been 
used to impute money values to a very wide range of 
environmental externalities and has given rise to a large 
amount of academic literature. 
The essentials of CV are simple.  Respondents are given a 
description of an environmental problem, a proposed solution, 
and the means of financing the solution (the payment vehicle).  
They are then asked what they are willing to pay for 
correcting the problem.  Willingness to pay is usually achieved 
by some form of bidding process initiated by the interviewer.  
As an example, the problem might be pollution of water at a 
bathing beach through the discharge of sewage.  The proposed 
solution is to upgrade the sewage treatment works to tertiary 
treatment levels.  This will be financed by an increase in the 
unit price of metered water.  Respondents can be asked to 
state the increase in unit price that they are willing to accept.  
Alternatively, and preferably, the interviewer will ask if they  
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would be willing to see price rise by, say, and 10c.  per litre.  If 
this is accepted then the suggested price rise is increased to 
say 15c.  If it is rejected the price rise is reduced to 5c.  The 
bidding process is iterated to determine the maximum 
willingness to pay. 
The attractions of the technique are obvious.  It is easy to 
understand and is flexible.  It can be applied to almost any 
externality, to tangibles and to both partial and total 
intangibles.  None-the–less, there are problems with it. 
Response biases.  A large number of potential biases are 
recognised in the literature which can be minimised, but by no 
means eliminated, by careful research design.  Where the 
externality under investigation is an intangible, the extent to 
which biases are distorting the results cannot be determined 
by reference to alternative measurement techniques. 
Treatment of outliers and zero bids.  The normal practice is to 
take an average bid (usually the arithmetic mean or the 
median; sometimes the geometric mean) elicited from the 
questionnaire, as the basis for estimating the valuation of the 
externality.  However, a CV study typically yields a 
substantial number of respondents who will bid nothing and a 
(usually smaller) number whose bids are wildly in excess 
(perhaps a hundred times) of the average.  The conventional 
practice is to exclude the high bids as outliers.  Zero bids are 
sometimes excluded but more typically now included in 
calculating the average.  How zero bids and outliers are 
treated has serious implications for the calculation of the 
average.  The rationale for exclusion of the outliers is that the 
respondents producing these bids are failing to understand 
the nature of the exercise.  This might equally be said of those 
who bid nothing and indeed of those whose bid is close to the 
average. 
Aggregation.  Once the average bid has been determined the 
value of the externality is calculated by grossing it up to the 
population of which the bidders are assumed to be a random 
sample.  But how is the population to be defined?  It should be 
those who experience (suffer from, or for a positive 
externality, benefit from) the externality.  This population is 
unlikely to be coterminous with the population at risk of 
paying for the correction of the externality.  Thus, in our 
example of the pollution of the bathing beach, users may 
include tourists from overseas or other states or intra-state 
visitors from other catchments.  With a partial intangible such 
as recreation or amenity, the population can probably be  
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defined, but for a pure intangible, such as wildlife, it probably 
cannot.  Are the sufferers from the destruction of Australian 
wildlife the population of the affected state, or the nation, or 
given Australia’s international commitments to conserve bio-
diversity, the population of the whole world? While choices 
about the means of averaging responses can make a difference 
of a few cents, choices about the population can alter the 
valuation by millions of dollars.  This issue is unresolved in 
the CV literature and examples exist of all alternatives. 
Replicability and consistency.  If CV exercises are meaningful, 
then they should be capable of replication with repeat studies 
yielding results that are broadly comparable with the 
originals.  Equally studies should be consistent in other ways.  
Thus, a study eliciting bids to conserve one example of a 
threatened habitat, should produce lower valuations than 
proposals to conserve many or all examples.  It has been 
shown (Meade, 1993) that CV exercises fail one both counts. 
Feasibility.  CV is a feasible technique for the estimation of 
tangible and partial intangible externalities such as recreation 
and amenity where respondents have some understanding of 
the problem and some basis for expressing a willingness to 
pay.  It faces serious difficulties with total intangibles such as 
wildlife and bio-diversity.  Bowers (1997) identifies two major 
and over-whelming problems: 
Impossibility of accurate description.  Elicitation of an accurate 
bid depends on a complete and accurate description of the 
problem and its solution.  With impacts on the natural 
environment, this is not possible in the time allocated to each 
interview.  While it is believed in general terms that, e.g. 
increases in dry season flows or reductions in nutrient 
loadings of rivers, will lead to benefits in biological diversity, 
the precise effects and the importance for the overall objective 
is not fully understood.  Hence, the understanding cannot be 
imparted to bidders.  In those circumstances, respondents 
seize on to the things that they do understand such as 
increases in the price of water and react to those; 
Lack of competence.  CV is asking respondents to use their 
experience in operating in real markets, to place values on 
trading in hypothetical markets.  But they have no relevant 
experience to bring to bear.  Consumers learn what are 
appropriate values in the markets in which they operate: on 
what is a reasonable price for a kilo of oranges or a property in 
Adelaide.  They learn in a number of ways: by shopping 
around; by talking to others; reading the press etc.  None of  
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this helps them in hypothetical markets for wildlife, bio-
diversity, or atmospheric integrity.  Furthermore, the methods 
of acquiring an understanding of appropriate values do not 
exist since the market is no more than hypothetical.  In the 
circumstance, it is not surprising that some refuse to bid and 
others offer large sums.  The bids that they make are no more 
than artefacts of the research process.  They have no external 
validity and are not an appropriate basis for taking policy 
decisions. 
In sum, CV is a possible technique for assessing tangible and 
partial intangible externalities.  It does not yield reliable 
money valuations of pure intangibles.  At best, it gives a 
ranking of people’s perceptions of preferences if asked to vote 
on an issue.  This can be invaluable in elucidating the nature 
of public preferences for delivery of intangibles.  Having made 
this judgement, however, we admit that others are of a 
different view.  It can be argued that non-market valuation of 
pure intangibles is valid.  Nevertheless, it is our perception 
that the neutralisation cost technique described below is easier 
to both explain and defend.  It is based on standards 
developed through the political processes associated with the 
development of catchment management plans and legislation. 
In situations where the intention is to transfer the results from 
a contingent valuation study from one location to another, as a 
general rule choice modelling rather than contingent valuation 
should be used.  Choice modelling collect data on the 
exogenous factors that explain each the values collected.  This 
increases the validity of transferring results from one area and 
one situation to another. 
Neutralisation cost 
The cost of correcting an externality is, in normal 
circumstances, no measure of its value.  Bowers (1997) shows 
this with an example of a road-widening scheme that entails 
the demolition of a bridge carrying a railway line.  The 
externality is the loss of the railway route.  The value of that 
loss depends on the volume of traffic that the line carries.  If it 
is disused there is no loss.  On the other hand, if it is a major 
passenger or freight route the loss could be very large.  The 
cost of replacing the bridge and correcting the externality, 
however, is the same in both cases. 
The cost of correcting the externality becomes relevant if 
avoiding the externality is a constraint upon decision-making,  
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since then the expenditure must actually be incurred.  Thus, if 
it were a requirement, embodied in regulation or legislation, 
that improvements to the road network should not reduce the 
availability of other transport infrastructure, replacing the 
bridge would be incorporated into scheme design and appear 
as part of scheme costs.  There would then be no need to 
measure the value of the rail route in a cost benefit analysis of 
the road-widening scheme since the scheme would not change 
that value. 
Engineers have long recognised, and worked with, constraints 
on scheme design.  Important ones are safety and health 
constraints.  Infrastructure works, such as bridges, incorporate 
a safety margin above maximum expected loading in their 
design.  Similarly, cambers on road bends are designed to 
provide a safety margin above maximum recommended 
speeds.  In sewage treatment works, there are similar health 
and safety constraints.  In designing structures, the engineer 
does not treat the safety level as a variable to be subjected to a 
cost-benefit test, reducing standards if economics dictates.  A 
minimum standard is a requirement dictated not simply by 
law and regulation and enforced by legal sanctions, but 
embodied in professional ethics.  Imposed constraints are 
equally not dependent on customer approval.  If a road bridge 
is built to connect an island community to the mainland 
financed in whole or part by the island residents, they cannot 
ask for reduced safety standards so as to reduce the charge. 
Constraints, such as health and safety, are derived from 
general duties of care.  A duty of care exists for the public safety 
and similarly for public health.  A duty of care, as imposed 
upon engineers and other public servants, contains three 
conditions: 
•  a duty to meet at least minimum standards; 
•  a duty to meet those standards in a cost-effective manner; 
and 
•  a duty to raise those standards as technology and finance 
permit. 
The basic way to deal with intangible effects of the water 
system is through the duty of care for the environment 
(Young, 1999).  This duty of care has evolved through public 
concern and legislation reinforced by international, national, 
state and local commitments to sustainable development and 
conservation of bio-diversity.  This duty of care for the 
environment, relates to risks of irreversible damage through  
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destruction of wildlife and ecosystems.  While similar to other 
duties of care, it is different in that there is widespread 
agreement that the current level of performance is 
unsatisfactory.  Thus, the duty of care for the environment as 
applied to the water cycle requires that environmental quality 
be increased.  The duty of care may thus be summarised as: 
•  a duty to maintain and enhance the quality of the water 
environment to the benefit of wildlife and other users; and 
•  to do so in a cost-effective manner. 
This duty of care for the water environment is often 
operationalised in WQO in  most catchment management 
plans and similar documents.  
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APPENDIX THREE PUBLIC GOODS 
Public goods lack one or both of the essential characteristics 
needed for the operation of a market.  These characteristics 
are: 
Excludability Property rights enable a seller to exclude non-
buyers from consuming the good.  Where a good is 
excludable, the seller transfers a property right to the 
buyer. 
Rivalness A market transaction involves sacrifices by both 
parties.  The seller is deprived of the services of what he 
sells and the buyer sacrifices opportunities to devote his 
resources to something else. 
These sacrifices are termed opportunity costs in economics 
and in a market economy are measured by prices.  The 
fundamental condition for the operation of a market is as 
follows: 
For a transaction to take place, opportunity costs must be 
positive for both parties, and the opportunity cost to the buyer 
must be equal to or greater than the opportunity cost to the 
seller.  [When the market clears (is in equilibrium) 
opportunity costs at the margin for buyers and sellers are 
the same]. 
If a good lacks excludability then it can be consumed without 
purchase.  The opportunity cost to the buyer in this case is 
zero and the fundamental condition cannot be satisfied. 
If a good lacks rivalness then the opportunity cost to the seller is 
zero and again the fundamental condition cannot be satisfied.  
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The argument is summarised in the Box  A3.1 below: 
 
Box A3.1 
Market good or service.   Opportunity cost equals market price and is the 
same for both buyers and sellers 
Tangible externality.   No market exists but a market is feasible.  Because 
there is no market either too much (negative externality) or too little (positive 
externality) is supplied.  Opportunity cost could be measured from either side 
of the potential market but it is normally measured from the short side i.e. the 
sufferer’s valuation for a negative externality and the provider’s valuation for 
a positive externality. 
Partial intangible externality.   A market cannot exist because the 
opportunity cost is zero for one side (good or service is non-rival or non-
excludable but not both).  It might in principle be possible to measure the 
positive opportunity cost of the other party and some of the methods 
discussed in this report attempt to do that. 
Pure intangible externality.   A market cannot exist because opportunity 
cost is zero for both sides.  (The good or service is both non-rival and non-
excludable).  There is no opportunity cost valuation.  
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